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5I~CE the late 1960s there has been a rapid ex-
pansion of multibank holding companies which has
had far-reaching impacts on the structure of banking
in the nation. These multibank holding companies
(MBHCs) were established as alternatives to branch-
ing systems in a number of states where branch bank-
ing was prohibited or severely limited.i The holding
company device for controlling and managing banks
is not new — having been used since about the turn
of the century — but its importance has increased
dramatically in the last decade. MBHCs’ control of
commercial bank deposits increased from 8 percent
at the end of 1965, to 16 percent at the end of 1970,
and to 34 percent at yearend 1976.
The rapid expansion of MBHCs in recent years and
the changes in banking structures and practices
brought about by this development have generated
much controversy regarding the merits and desirabil-
ity of holding companies. This article reviews evi-
dence on some niajor issues raised by the emergence
of MBHCs.
There has been a longstanding public concern in
this countryover the possibilities for excessive concen-
tration in banking. Many have feared that increased
concentration would place resource allocation in the
hands of a relatively small number of banking or-
ganizations in the financial centers. Reflecting these
attitudes and policies based on them, the structure
of American banking has been unique in the world,
with its numerous independent banking institutions.
At the same time, because of limits on bank entry
and branching, maximum interest rates on deposits,
and other regulations, competition has been limited
and individual banks, particularly in some smaller
communities, have attained some degree of monopoly
power.
iM}3HC5 have been established in various branch banking
states. Organization as an ?vIBHC can have advantages over
that of a branch banking system. For instance, a holding con,-
pany system can often maintain lower aggregate reserves than
the same-sized branch network.
A chief issue which has emerged with MBFIC de-
velopment has been the effects that these holding
companies have had on concentration and competi-
tion in banking. With entry into banking limited by
prevailing government regulations, acquisitions by
holding companies could increase concentration by
reducing or eliminating competition, and permit the
remaining firms in the market to obtain monopolistic
profits by raising prices and lowering services. Since
there are no widely agreed upon measures of concen-
tration and competition, and since in some ways in-
creased concentration could be consistent with more,
not less, competition, evaluations have not been
uniform.2
From a review of banking developments since the
inid-1960s, it does not appear that national concentra-
tion has been a crucial problem. Although numerous
acquisitions did affect concentration from what it
would likely have been otherwise, given all other fac-
tors, concentration has changed only slightly during
the period of rapid holding company expansion.
Concentration, as measured by total domestic de-
posits held by the 100 largest banking organizations
in the country, changed little in the period 1957 to
1968 when holding company activity was relatively
dormant. From a level of 48.2 percent in 1957, con-
centration rose slightly to 49 percent in 1968. How-
ever, despite an acceleration in holding company
acquisitions after 1968, many of which were made
by the 100 largest banking organizations, nationwide
2Evidence has been advanced which supports both the hypothe-
sis that increased market concentration results from efllciency
of large organizations and the hypothesis that increased con-
centration facilitates collusion among finns. The relationship
between efflcieacy and concentration, by itself, implies that
customers gain as a result of higher concentration, but the
relationship between collusion and concentration, by itself,
implies that customers lose as a result of higher concentration.
Since fewer restrictions on holding companies are associated
with higher concentration, there are both potential benefits
and costs for bank customers from snch lessened restrictions.
Gerald P. Dwyer, Jr. and William C. Niblack. “Branching,
liolding Companies, and Banking Concentration in the Eighth
District,” this Review (July 1974), pp. 11-18.
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concentration by these firms decreased from 49 per-
cent of domestic deposits to 47 percent in 1973.~
More recent calculations find that between 1968
and mid-1977 the 10 largest banking organizations’
share of domestic deposits declined from 20.4 to 18.3
percent while the share of the top 25 dropped from
31.9 to 28 percent. The 100 largest organizations’
share declined from 49.7 to 45 percent over this
period.4
The apparent reason for this somewhat surprising
result is that growth of domestic deposits (as dis-
tinct from foreign) was slower at the larger banking
offices during the 1968-77 period than deposit growth
at smaller banking offices. Also, there was a con-
straining influence on the larger organizations from
antitrust laws and policies. Although over one-half
of the 100 largest hank holding companies acquired
other banks through the holding conipany device, a
large portion of those acquired were de nova or small
“foothold” acquisitions.
Nevertheless, acquisitions by the 100 largest bank-
ing organizations between 1968 and 1973 did maintain
nationwide concentration of domestic deposits above
what otherwise would have prevailed. If the quanti-
tative impact of these acquisitions is subtracted from
the 1973 actual ratio of concentration, the resultant
adjusted nationwide concentration ratio for 1973
would have been 44.7 percent. Since the actual ratio
was 47 percent, holding company acquisitions in the
1968-73 period, everything else equal, increased con-
centration by 2.3 percentage points above the level
that would have existed in the absence of such acquisi-
tions. Thus, the pronounced increase in the share of
total deposits of banks in MBHCs, mentioned in the
introduction, reflected primarily the largest banks in
the nation forming MBHCs and not acquisitions by
the large banking organizations.
(]oicyen.(rn.tio~n
i’here is justification for measuring concentration in
an area smaller than the nation since the market for
most banks is considerably less than the entire coun-
try. Since the state is the largest area within which
banks can legally branch and form holding companies>
3
Samnel H. Talley, “The Impact of Holding Company Acquisi-
tions on Aggregate Concentration in Banking,” Staff Economic
Studies (80), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 1974.
4
Statement by Philip F. Coldwell, member of the l3oard of
Governors of the Federal Resen’e System, before the Con,-
mittee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States
Senate, March 7, 1978.
and hence attempt to gain monopoly power, some feel
that states are the relevant areas for measuring con-
centration.5 Also, interbank rivalry may be dependent
not only on local market concentration, but also on
the degree to which a few large banking organiza-
tions in a state, each of which has banking offices in
several common local markets, agree not to engage us
competitive behavior in any such local markets.°
Available evidence indicates that trends in statewide
concentration in banking have varied markedly from
state to state, with average changes remaining small.
Between 1960 and 1976, there was no overall trend
toward increased concentration of the three largest
banking organizations in each state. Calculations of
averages of changes indicate that states which al-
lowed statewide branching experienced a very small
increase in the proportion of domestic deposits held
by the three largest banking organizations: 0.2 per-
centage point. Limited branching states and unit
banking states experienced average decreases of 1.7
and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. Among state-
wide branching states, those with the highest concen-
tration in 1960 exhibited the greatest decline in con-
centration, while those with the lowest concentration
exhibited the greatest increase.7
Among the five largest banking institutions in each
state, an increase in concentration occurred in 28
states, a decline in 22 states, with one unchanged in
the 1968-73 period (the District of Columbia was
treated as a state). The median increase for all states
°Itmight be noted, however, that the Justice Department has
failed to win a banking case on the grounds of statewide con-
centration alone or the closely related grounds of potential
competition statewide. See Aubrey B, Willacy and Hazel M.
Willacy, “Conglomerate Bank Mergers and Clayton 7: Is
Potential Competition the Answer?” Banking Law Journal
(February 1976), pp. 148-195. Nevertheless, the legal issue
of whether states are appropriate areas for administering anti-
trust policies is not settled since legislatures in a few states
prohibit expansion by merger or acquisition beyond some state-
wide concentration level. See Katharine Gibson and Steven J.
Weiss, “State-Imposed Limitations on Multibank Holding
Company Growth,” Proceedings of a Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
1976, pp. 208-209. Also, Senate Bill S 72, the “Competition in
Banking Act of 1977,” would prohibit bank mergers or hold-
ing company acquisitions if the resulting banking institutioa
would control more than 20 percent of the banking assets
within the state.
6
See Elinor Harris Solomon, “Bank Merger Policy and Prob-
lems: A Linkage Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (August 1970), pp. 323-336.
7
Statement by Philip F. Coldwell, member of Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, before the Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,
March 7, 1978. See also Manferd 0. Peterson, “Aggregate
Bank Concentration and the Competition in Banking Act of
1975,” Issues inn Bank Regulation (Park Ridge, Illinois: Bank
Administration Institute, 1977), pp. 37-41,
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was only 0.7 percentage point. In the 38 states permit-
ting MBHCs, concentration tended to increase during
the period, while in the 13 states which prohibited
them, concentration tended to decline. Nevertheless,
the impact of MBI-IC acquisitions on statewide con-
centration \vas limited almost entirely to states with
low or moderate concentration.8
It might have been expected that holding company
activity would have its greatest impact on concentra-
tion at the state level, since holding companies are
prohibited from operating in broader regions and
since legal actions designed to prevent monopolistic
formations are usually focused on smaller banking
markets. Yet, what would appear to represent a sig-
nificant increase in aggregate concentration in some
states sometimes does not, in fact, represent any mean-
ingful change in structure. The increases in concen-
tration often involved acquisitions of banks which had
formerly operated as members of a banking group
unified through common owners and directors and
interlocking management.°
C.on.ceni:ration. •h4lMcfl~%14rets
Concentration in local markets is more crucial from
a competitive point of view than is concentration na-
tionally or statewide.1°In a local market, banks and
their customers are in sufficiently chose proximity for
competitive interaction to occur, and both information
and transaction costs tend to rise for many types of
services as the distance between the bank and cus-
tomer increases, reducing the threat of effective out-
side competition.~Local markets characterized by a
structure with relatively few firms and high barriers
to entry will facilitate pricing conduct that is aimed
at achieving joint profit maximization through collu-
sion, price leadership, or other tacit pricing arrange-
ments.12 Nevertheless, greater publicity is given to
8
San,uel H. Talley, “The Impact of Holding Company
Acquisitions.”
9
See Nancy M. Goodman, “Holding Company Developments in
Michigan,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Business Condi-
tions, (October 1975), pp. 10-15.
‘°Thisview has been adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
evaluating competition, See U.S. v. Philadelphia National Bank
in 1963; and U.S. v. Marine Banncorporatioa in 1974.
‘
5
One study concluded that distance dominates all other factors
in determining the selection of a banking office. Lorn,an L.
Lundstein and Lewis Mandell, “Consumer Selection of Bank-
ing Office — Effects of Distance, Services and Interest Rate
Differentials,” Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Struc-
ture and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
April 1977, pp. 260-286.
“See Stephen A. Rhoades, “Structure-Performance Studies in
Banking: A Summary and Evaluation,” Staff Economic
Studies (92), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 1977.
trends in concentration in the nation or at the state
level than at the local level. This probably reflects the
difficulty of defining a local market, but also reflects
a popular misconception that “bigness” alone is a
measure of monopoly power.
It appears that concentration has remained un-
changed or has decreased in most local banking mar-
kets during the period of rapid holding company
acquisitions. A study of 213 metropolitan areas and
233 country banking markets over the 1966-75 period
concluded that most banking markets became less
concentrated in that period. Also, the procompetitive
changes in banking market concentration occurred
with greatest frequencies and in the largest magni-
tudes in those markets which had a relatively high
concentration ratio in 1966.13 In addition, local areas
experiencing MBHC activity generally had lower ini-
tial concentration than areas where no MBHC acqui-
sitions occurred,14 Also, MBHCs tend to acquire banks
in markets characterized by relatively fast growth in
terms of banking offices, and relatively favorable ra-
tios of deposits per banking office.’5
One positive influence on local competition may
be stringent standards for approval of holding com-
pany acquisitions by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. Before approval is given to
a holding company to acquire a bank, the Board ana-
lyzes the effects of the proposal on competition in the
local banking markets. An application is denied if its
effects would be to reduce materially competition in
a local market, unless there are other strong mitigat-
ing factors.’” Managements of relatively large hold-
ing companies generally assume that proposed acqui-
sitions of relatively large independent banks in an
~Samuel H. Talley, “Recent Treads in Local Banking Market
Structure,” Staff Economic Studies (89), Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve Systen,, 1977.
‘~JackS. Light, “Bank Holding Companies — Concentration
Levels in Three District States,” Federal Reserve Bank of
Chicago Business Conditions (June 1975), pp, 10-15. See
also, Stephen A. Rhoades, “Characteristics of Banking Mar-
kets Entered by Foothold Acquisition,” Journal of Monetary
Economics (July 1976), pp. 399-408, which concluded that
the procompetitive effects of holding companies are less than
they might otherwise be.
“Gregory E. Boczar, “Market Characteristics and Multibank
Flolding Company Acquisitions,” Journal of Finance (March
1977), pp, 131-146.
10
1n administering the Bank holding Company Act, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has been ada-
mant not only in denying applications by holding companies
to acquire existing banks with which they compete, but in
addition, the Board has stood ready to deny applications on
the basis of potential competition and probable future com-
petition. See Harvey Rosenblurn, “Bank I-holding Companies
— Part II,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Business Con-
ditions (April 1975), pp. 13-15,
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area where the MBHC has a subsidiary would be
denied, and few such applications are even submitted.
In analyzing the growth of MBI-IC subsidiaries after
acquisitions, no significant effects in the market share
of affiliated banks yin-a-yin banks remaining inde-
pendent were found in four studies.57 This probably
reflects offsetting effects of MBHC affiliation. On the
one hand, subsidiaries of MBI--ICs enjoy greater fi-
nancial strength and ability to offer a wider range
of services. On the other hand, the independent banks,
on balance, can probably give more personalized
service and adapt snore quickly to changing local
conditions. Indeed, the independent bank’s response to
MBHCs in their area has probably intensified
competition.
A related issue raised by the MBHC development
is the effect of holding company affiliation on the
availability and cost of bank services. The evidence
available on bank performance is mostly indirect, such
as changes in bank operating ratios; hence, most con-
clusions are tentative.
It has been argued that holding companies are able
to offer more and better banking services to the cus-
tomers of their affiliates than are independents be-
cause of their larger size and superior management.
This assertion cannot be tested directly, but a reason-
able proxy variable for the general quality of banking
services is the rate of growth of a bank’s deposits.
Presumably, banks providing more and better services
grow faster than other banks. However, as noted in
the previous section, growth of affiliates has not been
significantly different on average than growth of com-
peting independent institutions.
Federal Reserve System application of the Holding
Company Act probably has some influence on foster-
ing better and broadened service by MBHC affiliates.
To promote public interest, the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem evaluates the effects of a bank holding company
acquisition on the basis of convenience and needs of
‘
T
Lawrence G. Goldberg, “Bank Holding Company Acquisitions
and Their Impact on Market Shares,” Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking (February 1976), pp. 127-130; Stuart
Hoffman, “The Impact of Holding Company Affiliation on
Bank Performance: A Case Study of Two Florida Multibank
Holding Companies,” Working Paper Series, Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, January 1976; David D. Whitehead arid B.
Frank King, “Multibank Iholding Companies and Local Mar-
ket Concentration,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Monthly
Review, (April 1976), pp. 34-43; and Jerome C. Darnell and
Howard Keen, Jr., “Small Bank Survival: Is the Wolf at the
Door?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business
Review (November 1974), pp. 16-23.
the community to he served.18 Every MBHC applica-
tion to acquire a bank must include a description of
changes, if any, the holding company plans to initiate
in either availability or prices of services and how
these changes will benefit the public. Proposals fre-
quently include establishment of a trust or foreign
banking service, raising interest rates on time and
savings deposits to Regulation Q maxima, reducing
rates on credit insurance premiums, providing data
processing services, expanding certain types of loans,
and providing snore customer facilities, such as park-
ing lots, Convenience and needs factors alone are sel-
dom the decisive factor in ruling on a case but these
pledges can be crucial in determining whether the
proposal is approved when it appears that other fac-
tors are marginal.’9 In one study in which stated in-
tentions of MBHC applications were compared with
actual implementation, no instances were found in
which promised actions were not subsequently taken.
In a number of cases, however, intentions were not
fully realized.’0
Even though many MBHCs have implemented
promised services and/or reduced prices, the differ-
ences between services offered by MBHC banks and
other banks have been marginal. Statistical analyses
show that bank branching and size are stronger de-
terminants of most bank behavior ratios than MBHC
affiliation.” Affiliated banks tend to reduce cash and
low-risk securities and increase loans, suggesting
greater credit availability by MBHCs.” Much of the
gain, however, reflects the acquisition of a number of
formerly ultraconservative banks. The ratio of time
and savings deposit interest to total tune and savings
“U.E.C., title 12, section 1843, as amended by Acts of July 1,
1966 (80 Stat, 238) and December 31, 1970 (84 Stat. 1763).
‘°See Michael A. Jessee and Steven A. Seelig, “An Analysis of
the Public Benefits Test of the Bank Holding Company Act,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Monthly Review (June
1974), pp. 157-167.
‘°Joseph E. Ross,nan and B. Frank King, “Multibank Holding
Companies: Convenience and Needs,” Federal Reserve Bank
of Atlanta Economic Review (July/August 1977), pp. 83-91.
This study, however, had basic limitations. For example, the
results were based primarily on a survey of MBHCs, taking
the company’s word for what was done.
“William Jackson, “Multibnnk Holding Companies and Bank
Behavior,” Working Paper 75-I, Federal Resen’e Bank of
Richniond, July 1975.
“See Lucille S. Mayne, “A Co,nparative Study of Bank Hold-
ing Conspany Affiliates and Independent Banks, 1969-1972,”
Journal of Finance (March 1977), pp. 147-158. Another
study. however. foimd that within county changes in bank
structure in Ohio by holding company acquisition did not
materially alter the supply of credit. Richard L. Gady,”Per-
fonuance of Rural Banks and Changes in Bank Structure in
Ohio,” Federal Rescue Bank of Cleveland Economic Review
(November-December 1971), pp. 3-14,
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deposits at MBHC affiliates increased relative to those
of independent banks, but the change was not statis-
tically significant.” The ratio of trust revenue to total
revenue tends to be higher for affiliates than for in-
dependents, from which some analysts conclude that
MBHCs offer more trust services. However, empirical
evidence indicates that trust revenue of banks in
counties in which one or more banks are affiliated with
holding companies was neither higher nor lower than
in other counties, holding other factors constant.’4
In short, most MBHC banks resemble non-MBHC
banks.” The impact of MBI-IC management upon the
behavior of affiliated banks is best analyzed on an
individual bank basis. MBHC acquisition of a “prob-
lem bank” or an ultraconservative bank could serve
the public interest, whereas an MBFIC acquisition of a
well-managed independent bank would apparently
offer few public benefits.
A study of the effects of 43 acquisitions of rural
community banks in Ohio compared with 101 com-
parable independent banks in the same communities
found several interesting impacts of the MBHCs. The
affiliates showed a greater preference for consumer
lending, but some lack of interest in real estate and
farm lending. Affiliate banks charged higher rates of
interest on loans, hut they required somewhat lower
downpayments and extended credit over slightly
longer periods. Independent banks generally provided
more auxiliary services with special emphasis on farm
management consulting and general tax and financial
advice. Holding companies introduced a number of
services for the acquired banks, such as data process-
ing, marketing, and loan participation arrangements.
Some independent banks responded by joining con-
sortia and relying heavily on correspondents in order
to obtain comparable services.’°
The available evidence suggests that MBHC affili-
ation has produced a slight enlargement in the avail-
ability of banking services. Holding companies have
“Samuel H. Talley, “The Effect of Holding Company Acquisi-
tions on Bank Performance,” Staff Economic Studies (69),
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1.972.
“R. Alton Gilbert, “Trust Revenue of Commercial Banks: The
Influence of Bank Holding Companies,” this Review (June
1974), pp. 8-15.
25
5ee Robert F. Ware, “Characteristics of Banks Acquired by
Multibank Holding Companies in Ohio,” Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland Economic Reyiew (August 1971),
pp. 19-27.
50
Warren F. Lee and Alan K. Reichert, “Effects of Multibank
Holding Company Acquisitions of Rural Community Banks,”
Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure and Compe-
tition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 1-2, 1975,
pp. 217-225.
had only a slight net effect on prices of affiliated banks
relative to those of the remaining independents. In
short, as one might expect in a competitive environ-
snent, availability arid prices of services have been
little different at banks, regardless of corporate form.
iT/(/~i/1.7j.Xi( ii/A~
I I t t 1
Although it has frequently been contended that
one advantage of joining an MBHC is improved op-
erating efficiency for the acquired bank, empirical
evidence does not indicate any such clear improve-
ment of efficiency of affiliates over independents. The
impact of affiliation on operating efficiency and profits
is difficult to assess from financial statements since
MBHCs may attempt to shift reported profits to the
consolidated holding company rather than report them
for each affiliate. This may be particularly true where
the holding company does not completely own the
affiliate. One study found no significant change in
operating costs when an MBHC acquired a unit bank
and an increase in such costs when it acquired a bank
with branches.’~
MBFIC affiliates, as components of banking organi-
zations larger than most independent banks, probably
experience sonne economies of scale.’8 MBHCs are
able to consolidate risks by generally having a larger
asset base and serving a wider geographical area than
most independent banks, reducing cash and capitalre-
quirements. Other operating efficiencies for affiliates
include better access to capital ~ advertising,
data processing, specialized lending, and trust and
foreign banking services.
Although ratios of total revenues to total assets have
been higher for affiliates than for independent banks,
total operating expenses to total assets have also been
higher.’” In particular, MBHCs incur larger employee
‘
7
Donald J. Mullineaux, “Branch Versus Unit Banking: An Anal-
ysis of Relative Costs,” Changing Pennsylvania’s Branching
Laws: An Economic Analysis, Technical Paper, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia, 1973, pp. 175-227.
‘
5
See Ernst Baltensperger, “Economies of Scale, Firm Size,
and Concentration in Banking,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking (August 1972), pp. 467-88; and Ernst Balten-
sperger, “Costs of Banking Activities — Interactions Between
Risks and Operating Costs,” Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking (August 1972), pp. 595-611.
~ of raising capital tends to be lower for large firms than
for smaUer enterprise. See Roger U. Blair and Yoram Peles,
“The Advantage of Size in the Capital Market: Esnperical
Evidence and Policy Implications,” Working Paper 24, Cen-
ter for the Study of An,erican Business, Washington Univer-
sity, St. Louis, December 1977.
‘°SeeRodney D. Johnson and David R. Meinster, “The Per-
formance of Bank Holding Company Acquisitions: A Multi-
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benefit costs and greater “other expenses” than inde-
pendent banks.” Because MBHCs are usually the
larger banking organizations, one would intuitively
expect them to have employee benefit pians which
would tend to be extended to subsidiaries. The “other
expenses” category includes many diverse bank ex-
penses, and the actual reasons for the higher “other
expenses” for holding company banks is not known.
One could speculate that costs relating to the holding
company structure and included in this category, such
as management or legal fees, could conceivably drain
some “profits” from the subsidiary banks.
Nevertheless, holding company acquisitions have
probably had only moderate effects on prices, ex-
penses, profitability, or performance of acquired
banks.” Since MBHCs have slightly higher operating
costs than independent banks, it has been contended
that affiliation with a holding company entails net
diseconamies of scale rather than economies.” Using
a different line of reasoning, a study of Alabama banks
over the period 1968 to 1973 found that, on balance,
technical and operational efficiency improved for both
independent and affiliate banks. Since this was a
period in which the dominant change in the state’s
banking industry was the emergence of an aggressive
MBHC movement, the findings were tentatively at-
tributed to that activity.”
Since there are significant differences between in-
dividual holding companies, it is probably misleading
to group them in some average. NIany of the perform-
ance measures indicate that operations of banks affil-
iated with particular holding companies differed sig-
nificantly from both independent banks and banks
variate Analysis,” Journal of Business (April 1975), pp.
204-212, and Robert J. Lawrence, The Performance of Bank
Holding Companies, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, 1967.
“Jack S. Light, “Effects of Holding Company Affiliation on
De Novo Banks,” Proceedings of a Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,
1976, pp. 83-106.
“Samuel H. Talley, “The Effect of Holding Company Acquisi-
tion on Bank Performance,” Staff Economic Studies (69),
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1972.
Also, Lucille S. Mayne, “Management Policies of Bank Hold-
ing Companies and Bank Perfonnance,” Journal of Bank Re-
search (Spring 1976), pp. 37-48.
33
Dale S. Drum, “MBHCs: Evidence After Two Decades of
Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bus-inns Con-
ditions, (December 1976), pp. 3-15. See also, George J.
Benston and Gerald A. Hanweck, “A Sunimary Report on
Bank Holding Company Affiliation and Economies of Scale,”
Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Chicago (April 1977) pp. 158-168.
‘
4
Terrence F. Martell and Donald L. Hooks, “Holding Com-
pany Affiliation and Economies of Scale,” Journal of the Mid-
west Finance Association (1975), pp. 59-71.
affiliated with other holding companies. It was possi-
ble in a number of instances to reject the hypothesis
that holding-company-affiliated banks can be treated
as elements of a single group as far as performance
is concerned.”
Examining the profitability of MBHC banks com-
pared with independent banks through the use of
performance ratios has not produced uniform results.
In one study, MBHC affiliation was found to have a
negative impact on the ratios of net income to total
assets and on net income to equity.’6 Another inquiry
found no significant difference in holding company
performance on net income to equity from that of
independent banks.’~
Two studies by John NIingo, taken together, hint at
a third view of the profitability of MBHC affiliates.
The first study found that holding companies tend to
purchase banks with earnings to capital ratios below
those of other banks.’~ The second found that holding
company banks, after acquisition, tend to have higher
net earnings to capital ratios than do independent
banks.’” A conclusion that MBHCs improved the prof-
itability of acquired banks, however, may not be war-
ranted in view of the changed samples.
The evidence on the profitability of MBHC affiliates
is mixed, and the issue is not likely to be settled soon.
In a number of cases, subsidiaries have been less prof-
itable than independents of similar size in the same
general area. However, the holding company may be
attempting to maximize profits of the system rather
than for each subsidiary. Also, many acquisitions have
been of banks with below average profitability, and it
may take more time to get a fair evaluation of their
performance within the holding company. To date,
only a few MBHC affiliates have been liquidated,
sold, or spun off, indicating that any drag on the
system’s profitability has not been intolerable,
35
Arthur C. Fraas, “The Perfonnance of Individual Bank Hold-
ing Companies,’ Staff Economic Study (84), Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System, 1974.
‘°JackS. Light, “Effects of Holding Conspany Affiliation on Dc
Novu Banks,” Proceedings of a Conference on Bank Structure
and Competition, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May
1976, pp. 83-106,
“William Jackson, “Multibank Holding Companies and Bank




John J. Mingo, “Capital Management and Profitability of
Prospective 1-folding Company Banks,” Journal of Financial
and Quantitatic-e Analysis (June 1975), pp. 191-203,
‘“John J. Mingo, “Managerial Motives, Market Structure and
the Perfonnance of Holding Company Banks,” Economic
Inquiry (September 1976), pp. 411-424.
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Holding companies claim that they strengthen ac-
quired banks in a number of ways. At times, they pro-
vide additional capital, personnel training, or skilled
management. They diversify risks and lower the costs
of providing certain specialized services. Resources of
the entire system can he mobilized to solve a local
bank’s problems. Yet, most analyses have indicated
that the alleged benefits of MBHCs on bank sound-
ness are exaggerated. It is still not clear whether the
holding company movement has, on balance, in-
creased or reduced the soundness of banks.
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System denies applications of proposed holding com-
pany acquisitions if the payments necessary to retire
debt incurred in buying the bank’s stock would be
likely to drain its retained earnings. In addition, cap-
ital has been supplied by the parent holding com-
panies to a number of subsidiaries. Nevertheless, the
capital positions of a number of acquired banks have
been relatively low. The average ratio of capital to
total assets or deposits is generally lower for affili-
ated banks than for independent counterparts.’” How-
ever, it has been found that holding company affilia-
tion caused only a small decline in the capital to
deposits ratio, one which was not statistically
signiflcant.41
MBHC banks, on average, are leveraged to a greater
extent than independent banks (as measured by lower
capital/asset ratios), and hold greater proportions of
higher-yielding (presumably more risky) assets than
do comparable independents. Also, as market concen-
tration increases, capital to asset ratios rise for inde-
pendent banks as a class but decline for holding
company banks. Such observations suggest that inde-
pendent banks take most benefits of greater market
power in the form of reduced risk, w’hile MBI-IC
banks are less ~ Although affiliation tends
to increase the payout ratio (dividends to net income)
for affiliated banks,” the funds may still be retained
within the MBHC organization.
‘“See Arthur G. Fraas, “The Performance of Individual Bank
Holding Companies,” Staff Economic Study (84), Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1974, and William
Jackson, “Multibank Holding Companies and Bank Bcl,av-
ior,” Working Paper 75-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, July 1975.
“Talley, “The Effect of Holding Company Acquisitions on
Bank Performance.”
“John J. Mingo, “Managerial Motives, Market Structures, and
the Perfonnance of Holding Company Banks.”
“Jackson, “Multibank Holding Companies and Bank Behavior.”
Through the use of the holding company, some or-
ganizations have engaged in “double leveraging” —
that is, raising funds through parent debt issues and
“downstreaming” equity capital to bank subsidiaries.
This practice allows the subsidiaries to increase re-
ported capital ratios, while increasing the leverage of
the holding company as a whole.”
A conclusion that affiliated companies hold less cap-
ital to assets or deposits than their independent
counterparts does not necessarily indicate that they
are undercapitalized or less ~ The risks of
banking are usually more diversified by having a
larger asset base, by engaging in more activities and
by operating over a wider region in an MBIIC ar-
rangement than for an individual bank. Since such
diversification reduces the lead bank’s risk, the MBHC
might assume a somewhat greater risk in each of its
subsidiaries than otherwise without increasing the
exposure of the system.’” Hence, even though an in-
dividual affiliate has less capital cushion, this might
be matched by help it could reasonably expect from
its parent should aversity arise.’7
Despite a tremendous expansion of MBHCs during
the last decade, commercial banking has changed only
moderately as a result of these activities.’8 Recogniz-
ing that it is too early to appraise adequately all the
ramifications, the weight of the evidence so far seems
to indicate that the net effects of the holding company
‘~See Federal Resen’e Bulletin (February 1976), p. 115.
-‘tmSee “Bank Holding Company Financial Developments in
1976,” Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (April 1977), pp. 337-340.
-‘“Leverage was found to be statistically significantin explaining
market risk premium on long-term debt when bank issues
alone ‘vere examined, but was statistically insignificant when
issues of bank holding companies alone were analyxed. Anne
S. Weaver and Chayim llersig-Marx, “A Comparative Study
of the Effect of Leverage on Risk Premiums for Debt Issues
of Banks and Bank Flolding Companies,” Staff Memoranda,
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1978.
‘‘Nevertheless, the potential benefits from diversification in
MBHC organizations has been found to be limited dime to the
relatively homogeneous nature of holding company acquisi-
tions of banks. See Peter S. Rose, “The Pattern of Bank
1-bIding Comnpany Acquisitious,” Journal of Bank Research
(Autumn 1976), pp. 236-240.
‘
8
5ee Stephen A. Rhoades, “Structure and Performance Studies
in Banking: A Summary and Evaluation,” Staff Econonmic
Studies (92), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, December 1977, p. 45.Based on a review of 39 studies
of market structure and performance published since 1959,
it was concluded that the changed market structure has had
only a small quantitative effect on price or profit performance
in banking.
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movement have been favorable for the general public.
The fear that commercial banking would become less
competitive if holding companies \vere permitted has
not been substantiated. In many local markets, affili-
ates of MBI-lCs have increased competition, and the
independent bank’s response to the introduction of a
holding company competitor has frequently also been
to intensify competition.
On balance, MBFICs have offered a slightly wider
range of banking services and have increased credit
extended to consumers and small businesses over what
otherwise would have been likely. As a result, reve-
nues of affiliates have been higher than at independent
banks, but costs have also been greater.
Affiliates of MBHCs are not as well capitalized as
their independent counterparts, hut risk is reduced
through greater diversification. Independent banks do
not seem to have been harmed by the introduction of
a holding company operation in their market area,
having grown at roughly the same rate as similar-sized
MBHC affiliates. Evidence on profitability of affiliates
versus independent banks is still mixed.
~c-~itH
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